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Porch suggests no alternative approach 
for afghanistan, so his critique has 
limited usefulness for evaluating U�s� 
strategy in that conflict� afghanistan, 
indeed, is a very tough case for Porch’s 
critique� It invites readers to ask whether 
problems there resulted from trying too 
much or too little CoIN, while domestic 
support in the United states for the war 
was high before getting distracted with 
Iraq� or perhaps the strategic context 
was so challenging that nothing better 
than a weak government in Kabul could 
have been expected—implying, perhaps,  
that after scattering al Qaeda in 2001, 
the best realistic option would have 
been to withdraw quickly and turn the 
struggle over to whatever government 
the afghans managed to establish, even 
if it did not meet many Western stan-
dards of good government� or maybe 
the problem was that CoIN doctrine 
can lead to unrealistic expectations that 
provoke precisely the kind of critique 
Porch has written� Had Porch focused 
more on what is necessary to make 
such expectations more sober—how he 
might have rewritten army FM 3-24, 
for example—his book would have been 
improved substantially� Instead, those 
who rewrite that manual will have to 
take both Porch’s book and more than 
a grain of salt into account in devel-
oping an approach to CoIN that is 
genuinely sober in its expectations� 
Karl WallINg
Naval War College Monterey Program
shi Xiaoqin� Seapower and Sino-U.S. Relations� 
Beijing: Military science, 2013� 320pp� Ұ42
Seapower and Sino-U.S. Relations is a 
comparative study of the quest for sea 
power by nations that are considered 
“maritime power states” and “continen-
tal power states” and it is an attempt to 
apply related lessons to an understand-
ing of current sino-U�s� relations� 
according to the author, traditionally 
maritime powers, such as the United 
states and the United Kingdom, have 
generally adopted a more offensive pos-
ture in their quest for sea power, mainly 
in terms of gaining “command of the 
sea” or in influencing development on 
the continent, as reflected in the works 
of american and British sea-power 
theorists alfred Mahan and sir Julian 
Corbett� The key to understanding 
Mahan, the author holds, is his empha-
sis on the aim of acquiring “absolute 
command of the sea” through decisive 
fleet engagement, which requires force 
concentration and capital ships capable 
of superior firepower� This central aim 
relegates other aims, such as sea-lane 
protection, commerce raiding, and naval 
blockade, and the building of capabilities 
requisite for them, to lesser priorities� 
Mahan, however, is critically questioned 
by Corbett, shi Xiaoqin points out� 
Corbett, for instance, believes “absolute 
command of the sea” is neither pos-
sible nor necessary, because most of 
the seas, most of the time, are open and 
contested and accessible for productive 
use and exploitation� as a result, flotilla 
operations to protect sea-lanes may be 
important, but building capital ships for 
“decisive fleet engagement” may divert 
resources away from them� also, the 
more the strong side wants a decisive 
battle through force concentration, 
the more incentive the weak side has 
to avoid such an engagement, through 
force dispersion to reduce losses� For 
Corbett, according to the author, sea 
control should also serve more useful 
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objectives like influencing developments 
on land (the european continent, in his 
time)� He, for instance, believes that 
such maritime powers as the United 
Kingdom are particularly advantaged 
in waging limited wars because of their 
insulated nature� Consistent with the 
British role as an “offshore balancer,” 
these wars may involve naval blockades 
to keep a continental opponent from 
entering the oceans; coordination with 
Britain’s land allies to bog down the 
opponent in a land war; selection of 
limited objectives against the opponent 
in far-away colonies, where the stakes 
are smaller and the enemy finds it dif-
ficult to mobilize; and expeditionary, 
amphibious operations against limited 
but critical and vulnerable targets on 
continental peripheries to restore the 
equilibrium on land� according to 
shi, however, a major challenge facing 
Corbett’s theory of limited war is how 
much the United Kingdom can devote 
to the continental objectives� Too much 
may get it bogged down in a land war 
of attrition, but too little may result in 
a policy of appeasement, where conti-
nental development is not impacted�
Unlike maritime powers, according to 
shi, the quest for sea power by continen-
tal powers, such as France, germany, 
and the former soviet Union, tends to 
be more limited� rather than seek-
ing command of the sea, their quests 
are more characterized by attempts to 
disrupt or deny the command of the 
sea by dominant sea powers, through 
asymmetrical strategies and capabili-
ties� also, these attempts do not aim to 
influence fundamental developments 
in the homelands of the dominant sea 
powers� Both the French and german 
navies of the late nineteenth century up 
to World War II, for instance, gener-
ally exploited technologies of torpedoes 
and submarines as asymmetrical 
capabilities� Being the weaker sides, 
for instance, they gave priority to not 
frontal fleet engagement but raiding 
the maritime commerce of opponents 
like the United Kingdom, a vulner-
ability of the latter as maritime trading 
and colonial powers� The soviet Union 
during the Cold War also prioritized 
submarines in its naval development, 
though it did develop major surface 
combatants� These ships served mainly 
to provide surface and air coordination 
and cover for submarine operations� 
a major reason for continental pow-
ers to be rather limited in their quest 
for sea power is the security challenges 
they face from both continental and 
maritime fronts� France, for instance, 
had to deal with threats from both 
germany and the United Kingdom, 
while germany faced challenges from 
France and the United Kingdom� simi-
larly the soviet Union during the Cold 
War had to prepare for a land war in 
Central europe, while at the same time 
handling challenges on its maritime 
flanks� The continental threats have 
generally constrained the resources that 
could be used for naval development� 
The author believes China’s geostrategic 
position today is quite similar to those of 
the historical continental powers� It faces 
challenges from an insulated maritime 
power, the United states, that intends 
to influence developments on the asian 
continent and whose disadvantages 
of distance are reduced by modern 
technologies and forward basing� also, 
faced with land-based challenges that 
may constrain resources, China’s quest 
for sea power is likely to remain defense 
dominant� To enhance its security, 
however, and not be pressed against its 
own shores, China is likely to strive to 
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 3, Art. 14
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/14
 B o o K  r e v I e Ws  1 5 3
extend its maritime strategic depth and 
to disrupt and deny the absolute U�s� 
superiority in the narrow “east asian 
littoral” or turn it into a “zone of contes-
tation�” China’s strategies and capabili-
ties, according to shi, are likely to be 
asymmetrical, and they can benefit from 
such modern technologies as long-range 
combat aircraft and missiles� China’s 
acquisition of major naval surface 
combatants mainly serves to supple-
ment such capabilities, as well as to 
protect vital sea-lanes on which China’s 
economy depends� on the other hand, 
reduced U�s� military forward presence 
and globalization-induced nontradition-
al security challenges are likely to offer 
opportunities for sino-U�s� cooperation�
This is probably one of the few Chinese 
books that reflect not only an in-depth 
understanding of Western naval litera-
ture but also analytical ability to evaluate 
this literature critically to gain insight 
into current U�s�-China relations� Be-
cause the author serves as a research fel-
low and a managing editor of the journal 
Strategic Studies at the War Theory and 
strategic studies Department of China’s 
academy of Military science, the book 
may reflect an important perspective for  
understanding the extent and nature of  
China’s quest for sea power� 
NaN lI
China Maritime Studies Institute
Naval War College
Yahuda, Michael� Sino-Japanese Relations after 
the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain. 
New York: routledge, 2014� 146pp� $149�50 (pa-
perback $33�18)
veteran east asia international relations 
analyst Michael Yahuda explores the 
traditional Chinese aphorism yī shān bù 
róng èr huˇ, or “two tigers competing for 
one mountain” (一山不容二虎), in ana-
lyzing the changing relationship of the 
two great powers of east asia—China 
and Japan� The proverb is a good foil 
for his subject and has led to a nuanced 
and balanced essay on Chinese-Japanese 
relations during the forty-plus years 
since the two established diplomatic 
ties in 1972� His book is succinct� each 
sentence pushes the narrative forward, 
making the book an ideal synopsis 
for busy policy analysts or east asia 
students with extensive reading lists�
The chronological meat of the book is 
a detailed discussion of key periods in 
Chinese-Japanese relations, starting 
with the rapprochement between Mao 
Zedong and Kakuei Tanaka in the 1970s� 
In 1972, Mao forgave the Japanese for 
twentieth-century aggression, even for-
going war reparations� China’s economic 
reform movement began with Deng 
Xiaoping’s visit to Japan in 1978, setting 
the stage for the 1980s honeymoon pe-
riod before the Cold War ended� This is 
instructive, because it demonstrates that 
tigers can more happily coexist during  
some periods than at other times� 
Yahuda then discusses Japan as the 
first country to reembrace China after 
the isolation imposed on Beijing in the 
wake of the Tiananmen crackdown of 
1989� as the soviet Union folded in 
1991, bringing the Cold War to a close, 
the trajectory of Japan as number one 
leveled off into a two-decade period of 
economic stagnation� In contrast, Deng 
successfully transferred the helm and the 
reform mission to Jiang Zemin before 
passing away in 1997� By 2000 Chinese 
gross domestic product (gDP) had 
grown to 25 percent that of Japan’s� The  
relationship between Jiang and Prime 
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